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Abstract
The Hewlett-Packard X- and V-Class ccNUMA systems appear well
suited to exploiting coarse and ne-grained parallelism, using multi-
threading techniques. This paper briey summarizes the multilevel
memory subsystem for the X- and V-Class platforms. Typical MPP
distributed memory programming concerns for the codes under inves-
tigation, such as explicit memory localization and load balancing, are
compared to relevant issues when porting and tuning for the X- and
V-Class.
This paper uses two small benchmarks as the basis for investigating
dierences running multithreaded codes in SPP-UX and HP-UX envi-
ronments. One code is from the Command, Control, Communication
and Intelligence (C3I) Parallel Benchmark suite, shown to have the po-
tential for large-scale parallelization with straightforward multithread-
ing techniques. The second benchmark exhibits the computationally
dynamic behavior of a thermally-driven explosion model. Both codes
are shown to stress the HP systems' ability to keep memory close to
processors and appropriate threads of execution.
1 System Architecture High-Level Overview
The Hewlett Packard X-Class and V-Class servers are symmetric multiprocessor (SMP) cache coherent
nonuniform memory-access (ccNUMA) systems, providing the illusion of simple, integrated memory. The
fundamental building block of the X and V-Class systems is the hypernode. Each hypernode is an SMP,
containing multiple processors, a crossbar, caches and synchronous DRAM (SDRAM) distributed across
multiple memory boards. Hypernodes are connected through a ring interface, referred to as Coherent
Toroidal Interconnect (CTI).
1.1 Globally Shared Memory
All processors in X and V-Class servers share memory within a hypernode (local memory) and across the
entire collection of hypernodes (remote memory). The global shared memory (GSM) subsystem is two-level;
each of which is tuned for a particular class of data sharing. Level one includes a crossbar, connecting
memory, processors and I/O within a hypernode. The crossbar provides high bandwidth, low latency non-
blocking access from processors and I/O channels to hypernode local memory. Level two encompasses the
interconnection between hypernodes through the use of CTI rings. The CTI is a collection of rings used to
access remote memory across hypernodes. CTI is specially designed to enable extremely high-bandwidth
(15.3 Gigabytes/second) data movement between processors, I/O devices and memory on a node. Mem-
ory references not satised by level one memory subsystem requests use the crossbar and CTI (level two)
interconnection, to access data not in hypernode local memory.
1.2 Globally Shared Memory and Cache Coherence
All processor references to memory, cause copies of the accessed data to be encached into either the
instruction or data cache of each processor. Processor local cache holds the most frequently accessed data.
When cache misses are encountered, an attempt is made to retrieve data from node local SDRAM. When
requested data is not resident in local cache nor local memory, the data resides in memory of another node.
Such remote data is obtained via the CTI interconnect. Since remote memory accesses come with a high
latency cost, each node has local memory dedicated to CTI cache. The CTI cache is responsible for caching
data accessed by other nodes, thus reducing the time to retrieve remote memory.
When a processor modies data within its data cache, and another processor references the same data,
stale data conditions exist. The X- and V-Class hardware supports cache coherence, thus each processor
is assured caches always contain the latest data values. Hardware supported cache coherence relieves the
programmer from explicitly ushing cache and tending to expensive synchronization details. Maintaining
coherent copies of processor cache is achieved by adherence to the following rules:
 Any number of read encachements on a cache line can occur concurrently. A cache line can be read-
shared in multiple caches.
 A processor must exclusively \own" a cache line in order to write data into a cache line.
 Modied cache lines must be written back to memory from the cache before overwriting occurs.
Particular hardware characteristics for the platforms used in our benchmarking are listed in Table 1.
System CPU CPUs/Node Nodes Clock Speed Data/Instr Cache Memory/Node OS
V2250 PA-8200 16 2 240 MHz 2MB/2MB 8GB HP-UX 11.01
X2000 PA-8000 16 16 180 MHz 1MB/1MB 4GB SPP-UX 5.3
Tab. 1: Platform Specics
2 The Benchmark Problems
The U.S. Air Force Rome Laboratory C3I Parallel Benchmark Suite [1] consists of eight problems chosen
to compactly represent the essential elements of real C3I applications. The C3I representative benchmark
discussed in this paper is Threat Analysis|a time-stepped simulation involving the trajectories of incoming
ballistic threats, with computation of options for intercepting the threats. The benchmark includes input
data sets, a sequential C program, and output sets to validate correctness. Threat Analysis is computa-
tionally intensive, compact, and involves non-trivial data and control structures. It should make a good
test for compiler parallelization eectiveness and multithreaded performance analysis on the X- and V-Class
architectures.
3 Threat Analysis
The Threat Analysis problem is a time-stepped simulation of the trajectories of incoming ballistic threats
with computation of options for intercepting the threats. The input to the problem consists of (i) the
trajectories of a set of incoming threats, and (ii) the locations and capabilities corresponding to a set of
weapons used to intercept incoming threats. For each threat and weapon pair, the program computes time
intervals over which a given threat can be intercepted by a particular weapon. The benchmark provides ve
dierent input scenarios.
3.1 Sequential Threat Analysis
Program 1 gives a slightly simplied, high-level pseudocode representation of the algorithm used in the
sequential Threat Analysis program.
The program computes a set of tuples of the form (threat, weapon, interval) indicating which threats
can be intercepted by a given weapon over the time interval t1: : :t2. There can be zero, one, or more
intervals associated with each (threat, weapon) pair. The t1 and t2 interception times within the inner loop
are computed using time-stepped simulations of threat and weapon positions, and are not parallelization
candidates.
The three nested loops in the program are not immediately parallelizable, because all iterations increment
the num intervals count and assign to the intervals array. The indices that a particular iteration assigns
to cannot be determined without rst executing the prior iterations. However, these shared variables are the
only obstacles to parallelization of the outer two loops, as computation of intervals for each (threat, weapon)
pair are otherwise independent of each other.
ThreatAnalysis(
in num threats, in threats[],
in num weapons, in weapons[],
out num intervals, out intervals[])
f
declare threat, weapon;
declare t0, t1, t2;
num intervals = 0;
for (threat = 0 .. num threats - 1)
for (weapon = 0 .. num weapons - 1) f
t0 = initial detection time of threat;
while (weapon can intercept threat in [t0...impact time of threat]) f
t1 = first time after t0 that weapon can intercept threat;
t2 = last time after t1 that weapon can intercept threat;
intervals[num intervals] = (threat, weapon, [t1 .. t2]);
num intervals = num intervals + 1;
t0 = t2 + 1;
g
g
g
Program 1: Sequential Threat Analysis
3.2 Multithreaded Threat Analysis
It is relatively straightforward to manually modify the sequential Threat Analysis program into a multi-
threaded code. Program 2 gives a slightly simplied, high-level pseudocode representation of the algorithm
used in the multithreaded Threat Analysis program.
The outer loop over all threats is replaced by a multithreaded loop in which each iteration is responsible
for a dierent chunk (i.e., subrange) of the threats. The problem of the shared variables is solved by
modifying the algorithm so that each iteration increments its own num intervals count and assigns to its
own section of the intervals array. Declarations of other variables are localized by moving them into the
inner blocks. The outer-loop iterations are now completely independent of each other and can be executed
by separate threads.
The drawback of this multithreaded implementation is that it requires a larger interval array than the
sequential program. Since there is no way to determine in advance the number of intervals each iteration will
compute, each iteration's section of the interval array must be generously oversized. Therefore, the larger
the number of chunks, the larger the interval array. A distributed interval array approach would work
well for an MPI implementation of this algorithm. Each processor would get a unique chunk of threats
and updates a local portion of the interval array. A simple global operation would gather the distributed
interval array into a single solution set.
EÆcient parallelization of Threat Analysis requires more than sequential program loop parallelization.
It involves signicant modication of the underlying sequential algorithm to uncover the high-level purpose
of the program, and develop an alternative approach to uncover data dependencies and addresses common
compiler restrictions. Optimizing Threat Analysis, requires paying special attention to typical coding con-
structs, such as: tests within loops; ambiguous pointers; indirect memory references; subroutine calls; and
loop invariants. Many of these same code tuning techniques are transferable to algorithms running in MPP
environments. Although the data locality issues are, of course, dierent, eliminating clutter and permitting
good compiler optimizations are, in general, helpful for improving runtime performance.
Table 2 shows execution time on the X- and V-Class architectures for the multithreaded Threat Analysis
code, given various levels of optimizations. The compiler options +O3 and +Oparallel turn on block-
level, routine-level and le-level optimizations in addition to causing the compiler to recognize user-specied
pragmas involving parallelism. Note that performance improved dramatically by compiling with +Olibcalls
and +FPD. +Olibcalls uses millicode versions of frequently called trigonometric functions, in place of the
standard calls. +FPD avoids oating point traps on denorms. Higher clock speed and larger cache sizes of
the V-Class are major contributors to faster execution times than measured on the X-Class.
ThreatAnalysis(
in num threats, in threats[],
in num weapons, in weapons[],
in num chunks, out num intervals[], out intervals[][])
f
declare chunk;
#pragma multithreaded
for (chunk = 0 .. num chunks - 1) f
declare first threat, last threat;
declare threat, weapon;
declare t0, t1, t2;
first threat = (chunk*num threats)/num chunks;
last threat = ((chunk+1)*num threats)/num chunks - 1;
num intervals[chunk] = 0;
for (threat = first threat .. last threat)
for (weapon = 0 .. num weapons - 1) f
t0 = initial detection time of threat;
while (weapon can intercept threat in [t0 .. impact time of threat]) f
t1 = first time after t0 that weapon can intercept threat;
t2 = last time after t1 that weapon can intercept threat;
intervals[chunk][num intervals[chunk]] = (threat, weapon, [t1 .. t2]);
num intervals[chunk] = num intervals[chunk] + 1;
t0 = t2 + 1;
g
g
g
g
Program 2: Multithreaded Threat Analysis
Respectable speedups occur with relatively small input data sets (1,000 threat sets) across a few pro-
cessors. Good performance on larger numbers of processors is expected with larger scenario collections of
weapons and threats, generating more independent parallel threads of execution.
CPUs HP V2250 Timings HP X2000 Timings
Opt. A Opt. B Opt. A Opt. B
(sec) (sec) (sec) (sec)
1 211 463 280 591
2 106 231 140 296
4 53 115 70 148
8 27 58 35 74
16 13 31 18 38
24 9 21 12 44
32 7 16 9 34
Tab. 2: Multithreaded Threat Analysis Performance. Optimizations A: Source Code Pragmas and +O3
+Oparallel +FPD +Olibcalls; Optimizations B: Source Code Pragmas and +O3 +Oparallel
4 Thermal Explosion Benchmark
The Thermal Explosion benchmark simulates an explosive wave initiating chemical reactions in reactive
materials. The implementation is meant to stress a system's ability to keep memory close to processors.
Benchmark execution across various spatial parameters will help assess system performance characteristics
as parallelism is increased and caches are saturated.
The simulation begins with a detonation wave, composed of a lead shock wave, initiating a chemical
reaction in a reactive material. In turn, chemical energy is released which sustains the shock wave. The
chain-branching reaction mechanism is described at length in [2]. The mesh is kept static throughout the
simulation, causing highly time-variable work-loads per grid point to move through the mesh along with the
propagating explosive wave. As the explosive wave moves through the spatial extent, the system's ability
to keep memory \close" to processors is increasingly important for large and complex problems adding to
the work-load imbalance. In addition, suÆcient numbers of concurrent threads must be available for good
performance.
Distributed memory algorithms need to periodically re-distribute the computational work-load in order
to keep all processors suÆciently busy. Not only does this task add communication overhead, bookkeeping
and data movement preparation add to the cost of keeping processors uniformly busy with the simulation
task at hand. For particularly dynamic work-loads, the overhead for load balancing can be unacceptable
in relation to the total execution time. The Thermal Explosion code is implemented such that an eective
timestep drives the imbalance of work at each grid point, as dierential equations are solved.
The dierential equations solved in the simulation consists of:
(i) A temperature eld, with spatial diusion and enthalpy generation from the reaction.
(ii) A set of chemical species concentrations, which responds to a Gruenesisen-type reaction network.
Solving these equations involves two dierent timesteps. The spatial diusion solution involves a timestep
proportional to the square of the mesh spacing. The reaction terms provide a chemical timestep derived
from the maximum reaction rate driven by the temperature. During erce reactions, very small timesteps
are necessary for high delity simulation. The timesteps will be large for cold and fully-reacted conditions.
Figure 1 depicts the work-load imbalance over time as the simulation evolves. Much more computation will
be necessary at grid points with small timesteps, thus stressing the system architecture's ability to support
multithreaded implementations that depend on eÆcient memory access.
detonation wave
Chemical timestep
Spatial timestep
Imbalance =  max
spatial time step
chemical time step
effective timestep
Time
Fig. 1: Workload Imbalance
The multithreaded Thermal Explosion implementation pays special attention to pushing parallelism
to the outer level loops, and minimizing communication necessary between array chunks holding reactant
concentrations and temperature elds. Hewlett Packard specic pragmas are inserted in order to help the
compiler with loop-dependent variable instances and loop-level parallelism across particular indices. As
in Threat Analysis, automatic (compile time ags) parallelization by the compiler is thwarted by global
variables within loops and function calls. Modications to help the compiler recognize safe code segments to
parallelize are mostly straightforward, but require understanding the application's higher level purpose and
data dependencies.
Adjusting the number of grid points in the benchmark input parameter le provides an easy way to alter
the various levels of parallelism. With more grid points, a higher delity solution for each mesh entity is
calculated, aording the opportunity for more parallelism at the outer loop level. More memory traÆc is
also expected with ner grain mesh.
Looking for memory contention can be accomplished with the pmon process monitoring tool on the V-
Class, and cxperf performance analysis tool on the X-Class. Both tools showed signicant numbers of
unexpected data cache misses coming from a frequently called subroutine invoking the exp() exponential
function. A little searching in the exp() man page reveals a tip to try compiling with +Olibcalls, which
uses millicode versions of math library routines. Subsequent runs showed much more reasonable data cache
miss counts.
Additional investigation with cxperf on the X-Class shows a particular large iteration count loop in-
curring very high average memory latencies, indicating processors passing around the same cache lines.
Previous experience on the part of Hewlett Packard technical consultants inspired closer inspection of a sum
reduction within the loop. A little hand tuning cut the speed of the oending loop iteration in half. Such
an optimization is completely transferable to a distributed memory implementation.
Table 3 shows execution times (seconds) for X- and V-Class runs. Performance gains can be attributed
to cache residency and suÆcient parallelism. For instance, a 301 301 grid size would take approximately
3 Megabytes, thus tting into the data cache of four X-Class cpus and two V-Class cpus nicely.
Minimal pragma insertions and code reorganization were necessary for the base multithreaded implemen-
tation.
CPUs HP V2250 HP X2000
Grid Size Grid Size Grid Size Grid Size Grid Size Grid Size
201201 301301 401401 201201 301301 401401
1 12 82 247 44 115 356
2 8.41 49 25 66 198
4 5.6 33 98 14 43 123
8 4 23 66 9.3 31 79
16 3 16 74 6.25 30 57
Tab. 3: Execution Times (seconds) for Multithreaded Thermal Explosion
5 Conclusions
The Threat Analysis code requires algorithmic modication and some code reorganization for a base-
line multithreaded version. Since Threat Analysis started o purely sequential, the underlying high-level
algorithmic meaning had to be uncovered and implemented in a \compiler friendly" multithreaded manner.
Once this is accomplished, we see nice speedups, given suÆciently large input threat sets to provide ade-
quate opportunities for parallelism across outer loops. The multithreaded version of the sequential code is
no harder to implement than a distributed memory version would be, and will continue to scale nicely as
input data sets increase, given suÆcient memory for oversized interval arrays. The X- and V-Class systems
provide minimal, but useful, tools to help tune a multithreaded code within the GSM programming model.
The Thermal Explosion code also requires minor code reorganization and pragma insertion for a baseline
multithreaded implementation to emerge from a working sequential version. As hoped, highly time-variable
work imbalance per grid point results in reasonable performance, provided adequate parallelism is available.
Data required in our computations is kept suÆciently close to threads of execution on a given processor, such
that special attention to data locality or load balancing does not appear not necessary for this benchmark.
With performance analysis tools, experience, and a bit of luck, time consuming portions of the both
benchmark codes were identied and hand tuned for good overall performance. Choosing the right compiler
ags, hand optimizations and code restructuring to enable compiler optimizations are equally valuable for
an MPP implementation.
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